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   The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 can be divided into two distinct phases. The first, 
more limited, phase from August of 2007 to August of 2008 stemmed from losses in one, 
relatively small segment of the U.S. financial system—namely, subprime residential mortgages.   
Despite this disruption to financial markets, real GDP in the United States continued to rise into 
the second quarter of 2008, and forecasters were predicting only a mild recession.  For example, 
the Congressional Budget Office (2008) released one of its periodic “The Budget and Economic 
Outlook: An Update” reports on September 8, 2008. It wrote: “According to CBO’s updated 
forecast for the rest of 2008 and for 2009, the economy is about halfway through an extended 
period of very slow growth. … Whether or not that period of slow growth will ultimately be 
designated a recession is still uncertain. However, the increase in the unemployment rate and the 
pace of economic growth are similar to conditions during previous mild recessions.” In keeping 
with that view, CBO projected that unemployment would rise modestly  from 5.4 percent in 
2008 to 6.2 percent in 2009, and that fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter real GDP would grow only 
0.9 percent in 2008, but would rebound modestly to 1.8 percent growth in 2009. In summer of 
2008, when I was serving on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, there was even talk that 
the Fed might need to raise interest rates to keep inflation under control. 
In mid-September 2008, however, the financial crisis entered a far more virulent phase. 
In rapid succession, the investment bank Lehman Brothers entered bankruptcy on September 15, 
2008, the insurance firm AIG collapsed on September 16, 2008; there was a run on the Reserve 
Primary Fund money market fund on the same day; and the highly publicized struggle to pass the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) began.  
What caused the transformation from what appeared in mid-2008 to be a significant but 
fairly mild financial disruption into a full-fledged global financial crisis? Did the government 
responses to the global financial crisis help avoid a worldwide depression?  What challenges do 
these government interventions raise for the world financial system and the economy going 





THE FIRST PHASE: THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS 
 
The first disruption of credit markets in the recent financial crisis is often dated to August 
7, 2007, when the French bank BNP Paribas suspended redemption of shares held in some of its 
money market funds. A boom in U.S. housing prices had peaked around 2005. As housing prices 
started to decline, mortgage-backed financial securities—in many cases, securities based on 
subprime residential mortgages but then divided into more senior claims that were supposedly 
safe and junior claims that were recognized to be risky—began to experience huge losses. By 
early 2008, losses on these securities were estimated to be on the order of $500 billion dollars  
(for example, Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008). 
  What developed in late 2007 and into 2008 was a series of runs on financial institutions, 
but instead of the classic bank run, it was, as described by Gorton and Metrick (2009), a run on 
the shadow banking system. A bank has deposits that are short-term liabilities and assets that are 
long-term loans. Thus, in a classic bank run, when bank depositors run to withdraw deposits, the 
bank cannot readily convert its long-term assets into cash. In the shadow banking system, 
institutions has short-term liabilities in the form of short-term borrowing, like repurchase 
agreements (or repos), which use longer-term assets like mortgage-backed securities as 
collateral.  A key element of this borrowing is the use of a “haircut,” that is, a requirement that 
borrowers post collateral that is valued at more than the loan.  For example, if a borrower took 
out a $100 million loan in a repo agreement, it might have to post $105 million of mortgage-
backed securities as collateral, and the haircut would then be 5 percent.   As the value of 
mortgage-backed securities fell and uncertainty about their future value increased, haircuts to 
levels as high as 50 percent.  The result was that the same amount of collateral would now 
support less borrowing, leading to deleveraging in which financial institutions had to sell off 
assets.  The resulting “fire sale” dynamic (discussed by Shleifer and Vishny in this issue) led to 
an adverse feedback loop in which the decline in asset values lowered the collateral’s value 
while further raising uncertainty, causing haircuts to rise further, which forced financial 
institutions to deleverage and sell more assets, and so on. 
  One signal of the resulting credit market disruptions appears in the interest rate spreads 
between safe and risky financial instruments.. For example, the “TED spread” is the spread   3
between the interest rate on interbank lending (as measured by the LIBOR interest rate on three-
month eurodollar deposits) and the interest rate on three-month U.S. Treasury bills.  The TED 
spread provides an assessment of counterparty risk from one bank lending to another, reflecting 
both liquidity and credit risk concerns.  Figure 1 shows how the TED spread rocketed up from an 
average of around 40 basis points (0.40 percentage points) before August 7, 2007, to 240 basis 
points by August 20, 2007, before abating somewhat. 
  The collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 was the most visible of these runs on the 
shadow financing system. Short-term financing for Bear Stearns dried up.  Its long-term assets 
could not quickly be turned into ready cash at a fair price, and without access to short-term 
funding, it could not continue. The Federal Reserve brokered a deal a deal for J.P. Morgan/Chase 
to purchase Bear, which was not unprecedented, but as part of the deal the Fed also took onto its 
books $30 billion of Bear Stearn’s toxic assets, which was unprecedented. However, this deal 
and the opening of new Federal Reserve lending facilities to investment banks helped restore 
some calm to the market. The TED spread surged to over 200 basis points in March 2008, but 
then fell back below 100 basis points.   
  By summer 2008, credit markets were clearly impaired and credit risk was rising, as can 
be seen by the rise in the spread between interest rates on Baa corporate bonds and Treasury 
bonds in Figure 1. However, the financial crisis looked like it could be contained.  The Baa-
Treasury spread had climbed to over 200 basis points, but these levels were similar to those that 
occurred in the aftermath of the mild recession in 2001.  The TED spread, although elevated, was 
also below its peak values immediately after the revelations of problems at BNP Paribas and the 
Bear Stearns collapse.  Many forecasters in the public and private hoped that the worst was over. 
After all, they reasoned that the subprime mortgage sector was only a small part of overall 
capital markets, and the losses in the related mortgage-backed securities, although substantial, 
seemed manageable. Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office (2008) was forecasting in early 
September 2008 that the Consumer Price Index would rise from 2.9 percent in 2007 to 4.7 
percent in 2008. As discussed in Wessel (2009), there was talk in the Federal Reserve as to 
whether the easing phase of monetary policy might have to be reversed in order to contain 
inflation.    4
  The story of this first phase of the 2007-2009 financial crisis has been discussed 
extensively in many places, including in symposia in the Winter 2009 and Winter 2010 issues of 
this journal. Here, the focus is on understanding what happened next.  
 
 
THE SECOND PHASE: GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
  In the space of a few short weeks in the fall 2008, everything changed.  On Monday, 
September 15, 2008, after suffering losses in the subprime market, Lehman Brothers, the fourth-
largest investment bank by asset size with over $600 billion in assets and 25,000 employees, 
filed for bankruptcy—the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history.  Conventional discussions of 
the evolution of the financial crisis often view the Lehman bankruptcy as the key event that 
morphed the subprime crisis into a virulent global financial crisis.  Although the Lehman 
bankruptcy led a large increase in uncertainty and a wave of distressed selling of securities that 
caused a collapse in asset prices and a drying up of liquidity, I will argue that the collapse of 
Lehman was followed by three events that were at least as important in causing the subprime 
crisis to go global: the AIG collapse on September 16, 2008; the run on the Reserve Primary 
Fund on the same day; and the struggle to get the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) plan 
approved by Congress over the following couple of weeks. 
  In considering these events, it’s also important to remember that the financial system had 
been greatly weakened before September 2008 in ways that had not yet been fully recognized at 
that time. Just as a relatively small sound or vibration can trigger an avalanche, if the snow 
conditions have made the danger of such an avalanche high, it may be that with given the amount 
of systemic risk embedded in the financial system, some other stress or failure of a financial 
institution would also have revealed the fragility of the financial system—and then led to a chain 




The Lehman Bankruptcy  
  Many commentators have argued that the Treasury and the Fed’s decision to allow 
Lehmann to go bankrupt was a colossal mistake that turned a mild financial disruption into a 
global financial crisis. With hindsight, it is hard to argue that allowing Lehman to go bankrupt 
was the right decision. But it’s useful to remember that at the time, there was a plausible case for 
letting Lehman go into bankruptcy.   
First, in practical terms, the U.S. government or its regulatory authorities had no authority 
to put Lehman into a government conservatorship so it could keep functioning, as the Treasury 
was able to do with Fannie and Freddie Mac. Thus, the only possible solution was to broker a 
purchase of Lehman. Barclays was in discussions about buying Lehman, but British bank 
regulators were skeptical and the Fed refused to take more bad assets on to its balance sheet, as it 
had done with Bear Stearns. Barclays ended up buying parts of Lehman a week after it declared 
bankruptcy.  
Second, the bailout of Bear Stearns had extended the government safety net outside the 
banking system to investment banks, and the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve were 
concerned about increasing moral hazard incentives on the part of a wider set of financial 
institutions to take on excessive risk.  Indeed, as we now know, Lehman was going to 
extraordinary efforts, including engaging in shady accounting practices, to hide its leverage, even 
after the financial crisis started in August 2007.
3  Letting Lehman fail would serve as a warning 
to other financial firms that they needed to reign in their risk taking. 
  Third, it was an open secret in the financial markets and among government officials  that 
if any of the major investment banks would run into trouble, Lehman would be at the top of the 
list. Lehman was among the most leveraged of the major investment banks; it was unwilling to 
raise capital; it had a poor reputation for risk management; and it had a high exposure to losses 
on subprime mortgages because it had large holdings of securities tied to valuations of these 
                                                            
3As described in the Examiner’s Report for the United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern 
District of New York, Valukas (2009), Lehman Brothers used a repo transaction, referred to as 
Repo 105, to reduce net leverage by $50 billion when reporting earnings at Q1 2008 and Q2 
2008. In this transaction, repos were treated as sales, rather than borrowings, thereby taking them 
off the books.  In addition, Lehman did not report that only $2 billion of $40 billion of liquid 
assets were readily accessible.   
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mortgages on its books (McDonald 2009; Sorkin, 2009).   Sorkin (2009) documents that 
immediately after the Bear Stearns bailout, the U.S. Treasury Secretary immediately turned his 
attention to Lehman because he thought it would be the next trouble spot.   With Lehman’s 
vulnerability already well-known, it seemed that Lehman’s was a natural test case to provide an 
object lesson to market participants that they should take measures to protect themselves.  
Indeed, many of the derivative contracts with Lehman’s counterparties were unwound 
successfully after Lehman’s bankruptcy.   
  Finally, the financial system in mid-September 2008 was far more vulnerable than almost 
all policymakers and market participants realized at that time. There is a distinct possibility that 
the financial system would have imploded even if Lehman had been bailed out.   
 
The AIG Collapse 
  The Financial Products Unit of American International Group (AIG) had written over 
$400 billion dollars of insurance contracts called credit default swaps, which had to make 
payments when subprime mortgage securities suffered losses.  With the Lehman Brothers 
collapse, it seemed more likely that the AIG might have to make enormous payments under these 
contracts, so short-term funding to AIG dried up. On September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve 
stepped in with an $85 billion loan to keep AIG afloat (with total loans from the Fed and the U.S. 
government eventually rising to over $170 billion).   
The enormous risk taking at AIG and its potential to blow up the financial system had 
been largely unrecognized by government officials, regulators, and markets.  Once Bear Stearns 
had to be bailed out, it became apparent that a wider group of financial institutions could pose 
major systemic risks to the financial system. But in discussions at that time among regulators and 
academics about the need to regulate a wider group of financial institutions (in which I 
participated), AIG was not mentioned in the category of firms that would require special 
supervisory attention.  This, along with Chairman Bernanke’s later statement in Congressional 
testimony about how angry he was that AIG took on such risk, describing AIG as effectively 
running a huge hedge fund inside an insurance company (Torres and Son, 2009), indicates how 
much the AIG blow up was a surprise. 
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Reserve Primary Fund 
  The same day of the AIG collapse—September 16, 2008—also saw a run on the Reserve 
Primary Fund, a large money mutual market fund run by Bruce Bent, one of the originators of 
money market mutual funds in 1970.  Before the crisis, Bent had publicly criticized the industry 
for taking on too much risk in its asset holdings. He stated in a letter to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in September 2007 (Bent, 2007):  “When I first created the money 
market fund in 1970, it was designed with the tenets of safety and liquidity.” He added that these 
principles had “fallen by the wayside as portfolio managers chased the highest yield and 
compromised the integrity of the money fund.”  Alas, Bent did not follow his own advice, and 
the Reserve Primary Fund held $785 million of Lehman paper.  With the Lehman bankruptcy, 
the fund could no longer afford to redeem its shares at the par value of $1—a situation known as 
“breaking the buck”—and shareholders pulled out their money, with the fund losing 90 percent 
of its assets.  A run on money market funds followed, with assets in institutional money market 
mutual funds falling from $1.36 trillion to $0.97 trillion from September to October 2008. In 
turn, this run put  pressure on the banks, since a significant amount of bank funding was coming 
from bank commercial paper and certificates of deposits held by money market mutual funds. 
 
TARP  
  In the wake of these events, U.S. Treasury Secretary, Hank Paulson, then proposed on 
September 19, 2008, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in an infamous three-page 
document. In its original form, it would have given the U.S. Treasury the authorization, with no 
accountability to the Congress, to spend $700 billion purchasing subprime mortgage assets from 
troubled financial institutions, but which subsequently was used to inject capital into banking 
institutions.  It soon became clear that Congress would vote down the original bill, which it did 
on September 29.  Eventually the bill was finally passed on October 3, but passage required 




The Broader Context 
   If the Federal Reserve had cut a deal with Barclays to rescue Lehman before bankruptcy, 
would the crisis have been defused? The underlying stresses in the financial system were all too 
real. A counterfactual history would have to take into account that a weakened Lehman, 
purchased before bankruptcy, might have later brought down Barclays.  Rescuing Lehman would 
have increased moral hazard among other financial institutions, perhaps setting up a larger crash 
later. The costs of the AIG credit default swaps were eventually going to come due, quite 
possibly unexpectedly. Runs on various shadow banking institutions, like the run on Reserve 
Primary Fund and then on money market funds in general, were becoming more common. Here, 
rather than try to lay out a persuasive counterfactual history, I will emphasize two major changes 
that occurred by late September 2008.  
  First, even though markets had been digesting bad news about mortgage-backed 
securities since mid-2007, the events of September 2008 showed that risk taking was far more 
extensive than markets had realized and the fragility of the financial system was far greater than 
most market participants could have imagined.  The AIG blow up and the run on the Reserve 
Primary Fund revealed that the financial system was engaged in what could be described as one 
huge “carry trade”.  Technically carry trades are ones in which a trader borrows at a low interest 
rate to fund the purchase of assets that yield a high interest rate. Carry trades generate immediate 
profits, but may be very risky because the higher interest rate on the purchased assets may just 
reflect greater tail risk for that asset.  AIG’s issuing of credit default swaps is a classic example 
of a type of carry trade, because the firm was earning large profits on the premiums paid on these 
contracts until the tail risk became a realization.   In a prescient and now-famous paper,  Rajan 
(2005) warned that this carry-trade problem was a danger to the financial system because 
incentives in compensation schemes for financial firms were leading to financial market 
participants engaging in financial transactions that produced immediate income, but exposed the 
financial system to massive risks.   
  Second, although markets had been watching government agencies scramble to deal with 
the financial crisis since late 2007, the events of September 2008 raised serious doubts that the 
U.S. government had the capability to manage the crisis. After all, the Fed and the U.S. Treasury 
proved unable to craft a solution so that Lehman would not fail. The AIG bailout was huge and   9
unexpected. TARP was originally proposed as a flimsy, three-page proposal, which raised 
concerns that the Treasury was unprepared, and the initial TARP proposal failed on a bipartisan 
vote. Even though the TARP legislation was eventually passed, the reputational damage was 
done.   
   After September 2008, the pattern of runs on the shadow banking system intensified and 
worsened.  Banks began to horde cash and were unwilling to lend to each other, despite huge 
injections of liquidity into the financial system by the European Central Bank, the Bank of 
England and the Federal Reserve,  The subprime crisis had become a full-fledged, global 
financial crisis.   
  The patterns of credit spreads tell the story. As shown in Figure 1, the TED spread rose 
from around 100 basis points during the week before the Lehman bankruptcy to over 300 basis 
points on September 17, the day after the liquidity squeeze on AIG and the Reserve Primary 
Fund materialized.  The TED spread then dropped by 100 basis points, but as confidence in the 
ability and competence of the government to react quickly to contain the crisis weakened over 
the next couple of weeks, it climbed to over 450 basis points by October 10.   The spread 
between interest rates on Baa corporate and Treasury bonds, shown in Figure 1, also rose by over 
200 basis points and now rose well above levels that had been seen in 2001 during the prior 
recession period.  The stock market crash also accelerated, with the week of October 6 showing 
the worst weekly decline in U.S. history . 
  Conditions in the financial markets continued to deteriorate. The public anger that 
resulted from the TARP “bailouts”— which involved injections of capital into financial 
institutions, with little restrictions on their use— became so intense that it became increasingly 
clear that the new Obama administration, taking office in January 2009, would not be able to get 
additional funds beyond those already allocated to TARP if needed.  Figure 1 shows that 
although the TED spread fell from its peak in October 2008 with the help of government support 
to the financial sector, the spread between Baa and Treasury bonds continued to rise, peaking at 
over 500 basis points in December 2009. By the end of 2008, the stock market had fallen by over 
half from its peak in the fall of 2007.  
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The Links from Financial Crisis to Recession  
 
  Later data showed that the U.S. economy had turned down in the third quarter of 2008, 
falling at a -1.3 percent annual rate, but the recession that started in December 2007 became the 
worst economic contraction in the United States since World War II. Real U.S. GDP contracted 
sharply in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter or 2009, declining at annual rates of -
5.4 and -6.4 percent, respectively.   The unemployment rate skyrocketed, exceeding 10 percent 
by October 2009.     A worldwide recession ensued as well.  World economic growth fell at an 
annual rate of  -6.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 and -7.3 percent in the first quarter of 
2009. A more extensive description of how financial crises lead to sharp economic downturns 
can be found in Mishkin (2011), but the basic story has three interrelated parts.   
  First, a financial crisis widens credit spreads, like the difference between interest rates on 
Baa corporate and Treasury bonds shown earlier in Figure 1.  The result is that conventional 
monetary policy is defanged: even if interest rates on Treasury bonds fall because of a 
weakening economy and easing of monetary policy, the interest rates relevant to household and 
business purchase decisions go up, causing a drop in aggregate demand.  Panel (a) of Figure 2 
shows that Baa corporate bond rates barely budged at the beginning of the financial crisis in 
2007 or during the Bear Stearns episode in March 2008, but climbed substantially in September 
2008. 
  Second, the decline in asset prices during a financial crisis causes a decline in the value 
of collateral, which makes it harder for nonfinancial firms to borrow.  In addition, the 
deterioration of balance sheets at financial firms, which  have the expertise to mitigate adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, causes their lending to fall, a process which is described by 
the term “deleveraging”, which causes spending to decline.  Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows how 
total bank lending continued to rise early in the financial crisis in 2007, and even remained stable 
through March 2008 and the Bear Stearns rescue. Right after September 2008, bank lending rises 
largely because lenders were drawing heavily on already-established lines of credit, but by mid-
2009 bank lending is on a downward trend. Of course, this decline should not only be attributed 
to the decline in the supply of loans, but also to the decline in the demand for loans as a result of 
weakening economic conditions.   11
  Third, the general rise in uncertainty that occurs during a financial crisis also leads to an 
increase in asymmetric information, further hindering the ability of financial markets to allocate 
funds to households and businesses with productive investment opportunities. Panel (c) of Figure 
2 shows how the market for asset-backed commercial paper, which had seemed to be recovering 
in mid-2008, which dwindled from daily average issuance of $64 billion at the beginning of 
September 2008 to $16.6 billion by the end of 2009.    
 
Policy Responses To The Financial Crisis 
 
  The most powerful U.S. policy responses to the financial crisis came through policies that 
applied to the financial and banking system: conventional and unconventional monetary policies, 
bank “stress tests,” and bailouts of some banks and financial institutions. Many of these policies 




Nonconventional Monetary Policy 
  In 2002, when Ben Bernanke was member of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve, gave a speech (Bernanke, 2002) on the occasion of Milton Friedman’s 90
th birthday and 
concluded by saying: “Regarding the Great Depression.  You’re [referring to Milton Friedman 
and Anna Schwarz] right, we did it.  We’re very sorry.  But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”  
He clearly meant it. The Federal Reserve’s modus operandi during the financial crisis can be 
characterized by saying that the Fed was engaged in massive experimentation in an 
unprecedented situation:  that is, it was employing a large number of measures to contain the 
crisis, not knowing exactly which ones would work.   
To be sure, the Fed started off using conventional monetary policy—that is, targeting a 
lower federal funds interest rate. Starting in the September 2007 meeting, the Federal Reserv3e 
lowered its federal funds rate target by ½ percentage point from 5.25% to 4.75%, and 
subsequently pushed the rate steadily downward.  By April 2008, the rate was down to 2 percent, 
and by December 2008, the target range for the federal funds rate was 0 to 0.25%.  Even before   12
the zero-bound for interest rates was reached, the Fed had turned to nonconventional monetary 
policy measures.  Two nonconventional policy measures, liquidity provision asset purchases, 
result in an expansion of the central bank balance sheet and are therefore usually described under 
the heading “quantitative easing.”  One other nonconventional measure is management of 
expectations. I will say a few words about each.  
  The first nonconventional form of monetary policy, liquidity provision, involves 
expanding Fed lending to both banks and other financial institutions. Liquidity provision is 
directed at maintaining the smooth functioning of financial markets, but it does affect household 
and business spending.  
The traditional method for the Fed to provide liquidity has been through loans made at 
the discount rate—the interest rate on loans it makes to banks. In mid-August 2007, the Fed 
lowered the discount rate  to 50 basis points (0.5 percentage points) above the federal funds rate 
target from the normal 100 basis points.  It then lowered it further in March 2008 to only 25 basis 
points above the federal funds rate target.  In addition, the Fed expanded the types of securities 
that would be eligible to be used as collateral. But discount lending has two problems: 1) it’s 
typically viewed as a bad signal for banks to borrow through the discount mechanism, because it 
suggests they had nowhere else to turn; and 2) discount lending has traditionally only gone to 
banks, not to other financial institutions.  
  To solve the problem of negative signals, the Fed set up a temporary Term Auction 
Facility (TAF) which enabled banks to borrow anonymously at a rate determined through a 
competitive auction. The TAF auctions started at amounts of $20 billion, but as the crisis 
worsened, the total loans outstanding though this mechanism rose to exceed $400 billion.  (The 
European Central Bank conducted similar operations, with one auction in June 2008 leading to 
lending of over 400 billion euros.) 
  The Fed also invented new lending programs to broaden its provision of liquidity to 
beyond banking institutions.  These included lending to investment banks, and lending to 
promote purchases of commercial paper, mortgage backed-securities and other asset-backed   13
securities.  In addition, the Fed engaged in lending to prop up Bear Stearns,
6 AIG and to Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.   The enlargement of the Fed’s lending programs during the 2007-2009 
period was remarkable, expanding the Fed’s balance sheet by over $1 trillion by the end of 2008, 
with the balance-sheet expansion continuing into 2009.   The number of new programs over the 
course of the crisis spawned a whole new set of acronyms: TSLF, PDCF, AMLF, MMIFF, CPFF 
and TALF.  
  Yet another method to increase liquidity was through swap lines with foreign central 
banks. These foreign central banks also engaged in massive amounts of liquidity provision, but 
could create liquidity only in their own domestic currency, while many of their financial 
institutions required dollar funding to conduct their operations.  The Federal Reserve provided 
foreign central banks with U.S. dollar deposits in exchange for deposits in their home currency, 
often in essentially unlimited amounts.  
  Overall, the available research suggests that liquidity provision did help stabilize 
financial markets during this crisis. For example, McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang (2008) find that 
announcements about the Term Auction Facility (TAF) did significantly lower credit spreads.  
Wu (2008), Christensen, Lopez and Rudebusch (2009) and Sarkar and Shrader (2010) also 
conclude that the TAF and  other credit facilities helped lower interest rates.
1 Baba and Packer 
(2009) and McAndrews (2009), Goldberg, Kennedy and Miu (2010)  find that the U.S. dollar 
swap facilities helped improve the performance of the dollar swap markets.  Using a similar 
event-study methodology, Ait-Sahalia et al.(2010) find that liquidity provision in not only the 
United States, but also in the United Kingdom and Japan, did help lower interbank risk 
premiums.   
                                                            
6 The lending to J.P. Morgan to prop up Bear Stearns was in effect a purchase of asssets.  In order 
for the Federal Reserve to abide by its legal authority, it could not purchase private assets 
outright.  Instead, it made a nonrecourse loan: that is, the Fed had no recourse to require J.P. 
Morgan to pay back the loan, but instead would take ownership of the collateral, the $30 billion 
of toxic assets.  Hence the Fed would bear any losses or gains on these assets so in economic 
terms it had purchased these assets. 
1 For an alternative view, Taylor and Williams (2009) find no evidence that actual lending from 
the Terrm Auction Facility (TAF) helped to ease credit markets.    14
The second category of nonconventional approaches to monetary policy, asset purchases, 
is based on the belief that a direct purchase can stimulate spending by raising prices on particular 
classes of bonds, thereby lowering the interest rates that households and businesses have to pay.  
This policy began with the purchase of $300 billion of long-term Treasury bonds, which started 
in March 2009 and ended in October 2009.  Empirical evidence on a previous Fed attempt to 
lower long-term interest rates relative to short-term rates in the 1960s—which was dubbed 
“Operation Twist” because its intent was to “twist” and flatten the yield curve—deemed that it 
didn’t work (Modigliani and Sutch, 1967). However, as Solow and Tobin (1987) pointed out, 
Federal Reserve purchases of long-term Treasury bonds were small and ended up being offset by 
issuance of long-term bonds.  
   The more important asset purchase program, announced in November 2008 and 
terminated in March 2010, was the outright purchase of $1.25 trillion of mortgage-backed 
securities.  The Fed purchased mortgage-backed securities in an attempt to lower residential 
mortgage rates, thereby stimulating the demand for housing, which would not only stabilize 
housing prices and the financial markets, but would also stimulate spending on residential 
construction.    Research on the impact of the Fed’s large-scale asset purchases during the global 
financial crisis by Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2010), finds that these programs lowered 
long-term bond rates relative to short rates on the order of 50 basis points, and lowered interest 
rates on mortgage-backed securities even further by improving liquidity in this market, thereby 
having a substantial impact on residential mortgage rates. 
  Both liquidity provision and asset purchased fit under the general heading of quantitative 
easing—that is, ways in which the Federal Reserve greatly expanded the monetary base along 
with its balance sheet. There has been some question as to whether this expansion of the 
monetary base, by itself, could stimulate the economy. It’s not clear why this would work: as 
Curdia and Woodford (2010) argue, why should an expansion of the monetary base lead to 
higher aggregate demand when it was unable to further lower interest rates or stimulate bank 
lending? In addition, evidence from the Japanese episode does not provide much support that a 
pure expansion of a central bank’s balance sheet is particularly effective in stimulating aggregate 
demand (Kuttner, 2004).   Bernanke (2009) has also expressed his skepticism that quantitative 
easing, by itself would be effective. He indicated that the expansion of the balance sheet should   15
instead be viewed as a result of what he referred to as credit easing, that is, an attempt to lower 
spreads between different asset classes through asset purchases and liquidity provision. 
A final nonconventional approach to monetary policy is management of expectations. In 
March 2009, the Fed Open Market Committee added to its policy statement that it would 
maintain “exceptionally low” interest rates “for an extended period. There is theoretical support 
for the proposition that a commitment to keep short-term interest rates low for a substantial 
period of time helps lower long-term interest rates and also raises inflation expectations, thereby 
reducing the real interest rate (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003, 2004; Woodford, 2003).  But at 
least so far, no empirical evidence is available for how effective management of expectations 
was during this episode. 
 
The Bank Stress Tests 
  Financial markets began to recover in the first half of 2009.  The provision of huge 
amounts of liquidity appeared to do the trick in the interbank lending market, with the TED 
spread falling from its peak of over 400 basis points in October to below 100 basis points in 
January 2009.   This spread fell to below pre-crisis levels (less than 20 basis points) by May 
2009.  Credit spreads also began to fall with the Baa-Treasury spread declining from its peak in 
October, but at a slower pace than the improvement in the interbank market, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.  By late 2009, however, credit spreads were returning to normal, reaching levels that 
were just a little above those before the crisis, and actually lower than the spreads that existed in 
2002, shortly after the previous recession ended.  The stock market also began to recover from its 
trough in March 2009, leading to a sustained bull market in which it rose over 50 percent over 
the next year.   
A key element in the financial market recovery was the U.S. Treasury’s requirement,  
announced in February 2009, that the 19 largest banking institutions undergo the Supervisory 
Capital Assessment Program or SCAP, which are commonly referred to as stress tests.   The 
stress tests were a supervisory assessment, led by the Federal Reserve in cooperation with the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC, of the balance sheet position of these 
banks to ensure that they had sufficient capital to withstand bad macroeconomic outcomes.   The 
stress tests were designed as a forward-looking exercise to project possible erosion of bank   16
capital under two scenarios: the baseline consensus forecast by private sector economists as of 
February 2009, which entailed a continuing decline in economic activity, and a worse scenario of 
a much more severe recession (for details of the scenarios, see  Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 2009).    
The Treasury announced the results in early May 2009 and they were well received by 
market participants, allowing these banks to raise substantial amounts of capital from private 
capital markets that were required by the stress tests.  The stress tests were a key factor that 
helped increase the amount of information in the marketplace, thereby reducing asymmetric 
information and adverse selection and moral hazard problems.  Hoshi and Kashyap 
(forthcoming) found that similar stress tests in Japan in 2003 were a key element of the recovery 
of the Japanese banking system after the “lost decade” from 1992 to 2002. 
 
Bailing Out Financial Institutions 
  Some of the Fed’s liquidity provision was to bail out financial institution, as occurred 
with Bear Stearns, AIG and the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
In each of these cases, the Federal Reserve provided this liquidity in cooperation with the U.S. 
Treasury, which also made large loans.    
  Although the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) was initially intended to purchase 
subprime mortgage assets to help prop up financial institutions’ balance sheets, it soon became 
clear that agreeing on a prices for those assets was unworkable.  The Treasury switched to using 
the TARP funds to inject capital into financial institutions, thereby shoring up their balance 
sheets more directly. In addition, on September 29, the U.S. Treasury announced a Temporary 
Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds, which insured that investors would receive at least 
the $1 par value per share.   On October 14, 2008, the FDIC announced the Temporary Liquidity 
Guarantee Program (TLGP) that guaranteed newly-issued senior unsecured bank debt, such as 
federal funds (loans of deposits at the Federal Reserve) and commercial paper, as well as 
noninterest bearing transaction accounts.  Its stated purpose was to “strengthen confidence and 
encourage liquidity in the banking system” (FDIC, 2008).  Although these programs were 
initially intended to last less than a year, they have been extended several times.     17
  The spreading bank failures in Europe in fall 2008 led to similar bailouts of financial 
institutions: for example, the U.K. Treasury set up a bailout plan that guaranteed 250 billion 
pounds of bank liabilities, added 100 billion pounds to a facility that swaps these assets for 
government bonds, and allowed the U.K. government to buy up to 50 billion pounds of equity 
stakes in British banks.  Allessandri and Haldane (2009) discuss $10 trillion worth of these 
bailout packages across 20 countries, which includes both guaranteeing the debt of the banks and 
injecting capital into them.  There was a high degree of international coordination in these 
policies.   
  Ait-Sahalia et al.(2010) find that comprehensive bailouts which helped recapitalize the 
financial sector did help lower interbank risk premiums, but bailouts of individual banks on an ad 
hoc basis were received poorly by the markets and led to a rise in interbank risk premiums.   A 
plausible explanation is that when governments pursue ad hoc bailouts, it suggests to markets 
that the problem in the credit markets may be worse than they expected.  In contrast, pursuing a 
comprehensive approach to recapitalize the financial system helps to restore confidence and to 
unfreeze the credit markets.  Furthermore, they find that there were strong spillovers from 
actions taken in one country to others, suggesting the benefits of a coordinated policy response 
between countries to cope with a global financial crisis. 
 
       
Expansionary Fiscal Policy 
  Fiscal stimulus to directly increase aggregate demand was another key piece of the. 
government response to the global financial crisis, both in the United States and in many other 
countries. The incoming Obama administration pushed for the $787 billion fiscal stimulus 
package, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  The plan featured $288 billion 
of tax cuts and $499 billion in government spending increases. The evidence on the effect of the 
fiscal stimulus package is mixed, but two arguments suggest that that it was far less important to 
addressing the financial crisis than were actions by central banks to provide liquidity and 
government recapitalization and guarantees of the financial system.   
First,  as a basic matter of timing, most of the additional government stimulus package 
did not come on line until late 2009 and into 2010. While one can construct a theoretical   18
argument that the expectation of the stimulus package helped to reassure financial markets, any 
direct effect of the stimulus on the financial crisis through the early months of 2009 was 
necessarily quite limited.  
  Second, there has is a very active debate about how much a fiscal stimulus will affect 
output. For example, Hall (2009) summarizes the theoretical and empirical evidence on fiscal 
stimulus as yielding an output multiplier between 0.7 and 1. Analysis of the stimulus using 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models in Cogan et al. (2009) and Uhlig (2010) find that 
multipliers in the 0.6 range, while econometric evidence employed by Barro and Redlick (2009) 
finds an output multiplier of around 0.7.  On the other hand, economists in the Obama 
Administration and the Congressional Budget Office, using Keynesian, large scale econometric 
models, estimated that the output multiplier for fiscal stimulus were well above one.  Moreover, 
a number of models point out that when the interest rate falls to the zero lower bound after a 
large negative aggregate demand shock, the output multiplier from a fiscal stimulus may be 
much higher because expansionary fiscal policy raises inflation expectations, thereby lowering 
real interest rates: for example, Eggertsson (2009), Woodford (2010) and Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) find such a result in calibrated New Keynesian models.  The 
controversy over discretionary fiscal stimulus is explored by Auerbach and Gale in this issue.   
 
 
Have Policies to Ameliorate the Financial Crisis Succeeded? 
  The question of whether or in which ways the policies to defuse the financial crisis have 
succeeded will be debated for years. One group of skeptics points out that households and firms 
have seen tighter credit standards and a higher cost of credit during the recession, from which 
they conclude that monetary policy has not been effective during the recent financial crisis (for 
example, Krugman, 2008). Another view holds that many government actions were ineffective, 
while others may have raise the perceived level of risk in financial markets (for example, see 
Taylor, 2009).   
My own view, as I have argued more extensively elsewhere (Mishkin, 2009), it that 
conclusions about the effectiveness of policy should begin by considering the counterfactual—
that is, what would the likely course of events without the policy interventions. For example, if   19
the Federal Reserve had not lowered the federal funds rate by over 500 basis points starting in 
September 2007, its clear that, interest rates on default-free Treasury securities would have been 
higher, but I believe further that credit spreads would have widened by even more than they did 
during this crisis, because the weaker economy would have made conditions in financial markets 
even more stressed. The outcome would then surely have been that households and firms would 
have faced much higher interest rates, with the result that household and firm spending would 
have declined even more precipitously than we saw. The banking stress tests and systematic 
efforts to recapitalize the banking system also seem to have been useful. Some parts of the 
government intervention were less useful than others. But taken as a whole, I believe the 
government actions helped to prevent a far deeper recession and even possibly a depression.  
 
    
AFTERMATH: CLEANING UP AFTER THE CRISIS 
    
  The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 appears to be waning. There are three key areas 
of government policies to clean up after the crisis in order to restore the world’s financial sector 
and the broader economy to health. 
 
Shrinking Central Bank Balance Sheets 
  Actions by central banks to contain the global financial crisis resulted in huge expansions 
of their balance sheets.   The expansion of balance sheets arising from liquidity provision is 
typically easy to reverse because most of the liquidity facilities have provided loans at interest 
rates that are higher than market rates during normal times. As financial markets return to 
normal, market participants are no longer willing to borrow at above-market ranks, this source of 
balance sheet expansion naturally reverses itself as the financial system recovers—which is 
exactly what has happened.  
  The asset market purchases of long-term mortgage-backed securities are not self-
liquidating in this way. Over $1 trillion of the mortgage-backed securities have maturities of ten 
years or more. Thus, a strategy of just letting them run off will leave the Federal Reserve in this 
market for a long time, which raises several issues.  First, by holding these securities the Federal   20
Reserve will be exposed to both credit and interest rate risk.
2  Second, the presence of private 
securities on the Federal Reserve balance sheet means that the Fed has become directly involved 
in perhaps the most politicized financial market in the United States.  The public and Congress 
may begin to hold the Fed accountable for what happens specifically to mortgage rates, rather 
than to interest rates in general.  Politicians may tend to see the Fed as institutionally responsible 
for developments in the housing markets. 
  Can the Fed extricate itself from this situation by selling the mortgage-backed securities? 
The experience of the end of the purchase program for mortgage-backed securities at the end of 
March 2010 is encouraging.  For some months before this date, the Fed had been in essence the 
sole buyer in this market.  However, given that financial markets had stabilized and that the end 
of the purchase program was well publicized, the Fed’s exit from the market did not cause any 
disruption.  The spreads of mortgage-backed securities over Treasury bills did not rise after April 
1, 2010. This experience suggests that if the Fed announces a program of asset sales well in 
advance and financial markets are functioning normally, it should be able to liquidate its 
positions. Of course, if this turns out not to be the case, then the Fed could discontinue its sales 
and announce that its sales are contingent on the market continuing to function normally.  
  A final concern sometimes raised is that the expansion in the monetary base will 
necessarily be inflationary, but this is unlikely to be the case in the current environment.  The 
reason is that banks are perfectly happy to hold huge amounts of excess reserves—thus 
essentially neutralizing the effect this money would have on demand or the price level— as long 
as they are paid interest on the reserves, as is now the case.  However, purchase of long-term 
government bonds has raised concerns that the Fed is willing to accommodate profligate fiscal 
policy by monetizing government debt, and this does have the potential to unanchor inflation 





2 Because the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve is in effect part of the overall government balance sheet, it is not 
clear why potential losses on the Fed’s balance sheet should matter.   However, such losses would likely result in 
severe criticisms of the Federal Reserve and so weaken its independence.   21
Too-Big-To-Fail 
  The global financial crisis has encouraged efforts to revamp financial regulation. French 
et. al. (2010) offer discussions of financial regulation in the future, as do some of the other 
papers in this symposium. Here I will just focus on one issue, the too-big-to-fail problem. 
  Too-big-to-fail is a misnomer. A financial firm can be systemically important—that is, its 
failure can threaten the health of the financial system—either because it is so large or its 
activities are so interconnected with the rest of the financial system. A more accurate term would 
be too-interconnected-to-fail or too-systemically-important-to-fail.  The failure of the hedge fund 
Long Term Capital Management in 1998 is a classic example of a firm that was not enormous in 
size, but was systemically important. In any case, the difficulty is that when creditors know that a 
firm falls into this category, they can expect government provide some assistance if the firm gets 
into trouble, which means that they have less incentive to monitor the firm and pull out their 
money if it is taking on too much risk.  Of course, this makes excessive risk-taking more likely, 
and raises the cost to taxpayers of the eventual government bailout. 
  Too-big-to-fail is now a larger problem than before, in part because banks have merged 
in a way that creates even larger banking institutions, and because with the Fed bailout of Bear 
Stearns in March 2008, and then the financial assistance to AIG by the Fed and the U.S. Treasury 
in September of 2008, it has become clear that a much wider range of financial firms are likely to 
be considered to be too-big-to-fail in the future. Indeed, the most prominent case of a firm that 
was not bailed out—Lehman Brothers in September 2008—was followed by such a severe crisis, 
that it is unlikely that governments would let this happen again.  In the wake of the Lehman 
failure, governments throughout the world bailed out or guaranteed all their major financial 
institutions. 
  One way to address the too-big-to-fail problem is to limit the size of financial institutions, 
which might involve either the breakup of large financial institutions and/or limits on what 
activities banking institutions can engage.  However, arbitrary limits on their size or activities 
might well decrease the efficiency or raise other risks in the financial system.  An alternative 
view is to subject systemically important institutions to greater regulatory oversight, say by a 
systemic regulator (as discussed in Mishkin, 2010a; French et. al., 2010), or by imposing larger 
capital requirements for systemically important financial firms.     22
  The Dodd-Frank financial reform bill passed in summer 2010 gives the federal 
government one more tool for dealing with systemically important financial companies. Before 
Dodd-Frank, the U.S. government only could take over individual banking institutions, but not 
financial holding companies that own banks and other financial institutions.  (In other words, it 
could take over Citibank, but not Citigroup or a free-standing investment bank like Lehman 
Brothers.)   It used to be that the government had only two alternatives with such firms: send 
them into bankruptcy or bail them out. Now, the federal government has “resolution authority” 
over such firms, which means that they can treat them as they would an insolvent bank.  Critics 
have expressed concerns that this federal resolution authority will further entrench too-big-to-fail 
and so make the moral hazard problem worse (for example, Wallison, 2010).  As with all 
regulatory authority, the devil will be in the details. But the new resolution authority is likely to 
help limit moral hazard because it gives the government a big stick to force systemically 
important financial institutions to desist from risk taking or to raise more capital—or else to face 
a government takeover that imposes costs on managers and shareholders.  
 
 
Retrenching Fiscal Policy 
  The combination of massive bailouts, fiscal stimulus packages, and the sharp economic 
contractions that reduced tax revenue have shifted the fiscal situation for many countries.  As 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) point out, the aftermath of financial crises is almost always a large 
increase in government indebtedness and we have seen exactly this pattern in the aftermath of 
the current crisis.  Budget deficits over 10 percent of GDP in advanced countries like the United 
States have been common in 2009 and 2010. This rise in government borrowing can even raise 
the risk of sovereign debt defaults, which can be a particular problem if sovereign debt is being 
held by many banks as a “safe” asset. This risk has become a serious concern in Europe after the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis. 
  As budget deficits surged after the crisis, the ratio of government debt to GDP is 
projected to jump to very high levels in many countries.   In the next decade or so, getting fiscal 
houses in order will become one of the highest priorities for government policy throughout the 
world. In many countries, governments already faced a long-term problem of unsustainable   23
spending growth on health care and pensions; the current fiscal imbalances have brought those 
problems forward in time from the long-term into the middle-term, and in some countries into 




  What started in 2007 as a crisis in one small part of the financial system led to a world-
wide economic conflagration by late 2008 and early 2009. There are two key lessons from what 
has happened.  First, the global financial system is far more interconnected than was previously 
recognized and excessive risk taking that threatened the collapse of the world financial system 
was far more pervasive than almost anyone realized.  Understanding how systemic risk can arise 
and designing policies to rein in this risk taking are tasks of the highest priority.   Second, 
extraordinary actions by central banks and governments have contained this global financial 
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Figure 1: Credit Spreads 2000-2009 
 
Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis British Bankers’ Association 
Note:  TED spread is the difference between the 3-month Libor rate and the constant maturity 3-
month Treasury bill rate.  Baa spread is the difference between constant maturity Baa rate and 
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(c) Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Issuance 
 
 
Source: FRED database, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors. 
Note: The Baa corporate bond rate is the constant maturity interest rate, asset-back commercial 
paper issuance is the daily average of issuance of asset-backed commercial paper, and bank 
lending is total loans and leases of commercial banks.  